The “acquisition” process is a mess, in part because there is literally no single “commander” over it. Inside of the “acquisition corp” there are program managers, and contracting officers who have different chains of command. Note that contracting officers have a voluminous set of regulations to comply with; based mostly on congressional legislation. Then you have the requirements writers who use the JCIDS process. And some services have more than one chain of command for requirements; in the Army there are two 4-star commands generating requirements, TRADOC and AFC. Then there are the finance/budget folks who operate the PPBE process which essentially projects funding 5 years into the future, and multiple types of appropriations of funds which can only do certain functions. If a program manager cannot get a contract awarded with the contracts community and doesn’t spend his money on time, then budget offices will take their money, or congress might take their money. All of these communities have their hands in the “acquisition” process. Then add in the fact that defense contractors actually make the stuff for it when they get in contract; all the government work is just to get a contract awarded and overseen! It’s a bureaucracy more complex than any Rube Goldberg could scheme. The difference is Rube Goldberg’s gadgets actually worked. The “acquisition” process is slower than pond water, almost always runs late and costs too much, and sometimes delivers a shitty product (such as LCS), despite the fact that most of the people working in the process are actually working hard.
The whole system needs a re-boot top to bottom, and will also need congressional legislation to cut the bureaucracy. Our current process is actually one of the most dangerous foes we face.
Thanks for that insight, it is based on not trusting the manufacturers among other things but the more exquisite the program the more "forgiving" they will be in operational test for deployment. The Navy accepted an aircraft carrier with failing concurrent technology that cannot reliably launch and retrieve aircraft (you have one job!) wedded to an F35 stealth program that is an operational failure by all measures in peer fights.
Too many admirals, I agree; as with the rest of the armed forces, too many flags. And I agree with you regarding submarines. I could tell you a story offline about a former diesel boat skipper I met in Philly in the late 80's; he was CO of the Naval Station at the time. My son was on La Jolla until it was brought home from Hawaii to be decommissioned. Diesel subs can be very quiet in stealth mode; very little equipment is running, while on a nuke cooling pumps always have to be running, even if the sub is dead still.
It hasn't been about "defense" for a long, long time. I think while renaming "stuff," Trump should change the Department of Defense back to the "War Department," which is what it's actually about.
John, the decommissioning of the SOSUS system will be a day we regret because underwater traffic is going to be the dominant form of naval warfare for the remainder of this century.
Agreed on SOSUS. I would like for us to go back to a defensive posture, but. At least one President has been assassinated for seeking peace, call that a coup, followed by at least two others in my estimation. Threatening the military-intelligence-industrial-congressional complex can be deadly. Call me crazy.
can we kill the airborne divisions as well...? Unless we are going back to killing goat herders it could work, otherwise it's a expensive and pointless asset at above BN.
I speak to this very thing in Ep 008 "Fixing Fight Club: Reimagining Land Warfare or Else". Furthermore, static line mass tactical jumps have no military utility in the 21st century.
Ditto for air assaults. Rapid movement behind the LOC of company or battalion formations to check an unexpected advance or exploit an unexpected advance… maybe. But anything beyond the FEBA is gonna result in losing helicopters we can’t afford anymore. At marvel at the Huey loss rates, we could not conduct that same war with same tactics with Blackhawks and chinooks
MG, amen, a complete reappraisal needs to be made of the nuts and bolts of infantry on the battlefield.
Take a look at what ground fire (this is in 2003) did to 29 Apache helicopters in
the disastrous 2003 attack on Karbala, an unsuccessful strike on the Iraqi Republican Guard's Medina Division by the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Now fast forward twenty years and the technology to do that in an even more lethal fashion is even more distributed and inexpensive.
Affordable mass (precision and swarm) with increasing standoff ranges is quickly obviating peer advantages in mobile warfare.
The “acquisition” process is a mess, in part because there is literally no single “commander” over it. Inside of the “acquisition corp” there are program managers, and contracting officers who have different chains of command. Note that contracting officers have a voluminous set of regulations to comply with; based mostly on congressional legislation. Then you have the requirements writers who use the JCIDS process. And some services have more than one chain of command for requirements; in the Army there are two 4-star commands generating requirements, TRADOC and AFC. Then there are the finance/budget folks who operate the PPBE process which essentially projects funding 5 years into the future, and multiple types of appropriations of funds which can only do certain functions. If a program manager cannot get a contract awarded with the contracts community and doesn’t spend his money on time, then budget offices will take their money, or congress might take their money. All of these communities have their hands in the “acquisition” process. Then add in the fact that defense contractors actually make the stuff for it when they get in contract; all the government work is just to get a contract awarded and overseen! It’s a bureaucracy more complex than any Rube Goldberg could scheme. The difference is Rube Goldberg’s gadgets actually worked. The “acquisition” process is slower than pond water, almost always runs late and costs too much, and sometimes delivers a shitty product (such as LCS), despite the fact that most of the people working in the process are actually working hard.
The whole system needs a re-boot top to bottom, and will also need congressional legislation to cut the bureaucracy. Our current process is actually one of the most dangerous foes we face.
Thanks for that insight, it is based on not trusting the manufacturers among other things but the more exquisite the program the more "forgiving" they will be in operational test for deployment. The Navy accepted an aircraft carrier with failing concurrent technology that cannot reliably launch and retrieve aircraft (you have one job!) wedded to an F35 stealth program that is an operational failure by all measures in peer fights.
Agreed, and it is also based on not trusting program managers for performance, and not trusting contracting officers for taking bribes.
It’s astonishing that our bureaucratic system (and all of NATO combined) cannot even keep up with Russian artillery shell production.
Too many admirals, I agree; as with the rest of the armed forces, too many flags. And I agree with you regarding submarines. I could tell you a story offline about a former diesel boat skipper I met in Philly in the late 80's; he was CO of the Naval Station at the time. My son was on La Jolla until it was brought home from Hawaii to be decommissioned. Diesel subs can be very quiet in stealth mode; very little equipment is running, while on a nuke cooling pumps always have to be running, even if the sub is dead still.
It hasn't been about "defense" for a long, long time. I think while renaming "stuff," Trump should change the Department of Defense back to the "War Department," which is what it's actually about.
John, the decommissioning of the SOSUS system will be a day we regret because underwater traffic is going to be the dominant form of naval warfare for the remainder of this century.
I simply want them to go back to defense.
Agreed on SOSUS. I would like for us to go back to a defensive posture, but. At least one President has been assassinated for seeking peace, call that a coup, followed by at least two others in my estimation. Threatening the military-intelligence-industrial-congressional complex can be deadly. Call me crazy.
can we kill the airborne divisions as well...? Unless we are going back to killing goat herders it could work, otherwise it's a expensive and pointless asset at above BN.
I speak to this very thing in Ep 008 "Fixing Fight Club: Reimagining Land Warfare or Else". Furthermore, static line mass tactical jumps have no military utility in the 21st century.
Ditto for air assaults. Rapid movement behind the LOC of company or battalion formations to check an unexpected advance or exploit an unexpected advance… maybe. But anything beyond the FEBA is gonna result in losing helicopters we can’t afford anymore. At marvel at the Huey loss rates, we could not conduct that same war with same tactics with Blackhawks and chinooks
MG, amen, a complete reappraisal needs to be made of the nuts and bolts of infantry on the battlefield.
Take a look at what ground fire (this is in 2003) did to 29 Apache helicopters in
the disastrous 2003 attack on Karbala, an unsuccessful strike on the Iraqi Republican Guard's Medina Division by the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Now fast forward twenty years and the technology to do that in an even more lethal fashion is even more distributed and inexpensive.
Affordable mass (precision and swarm) with increasing standoff ranges is quickly obviating peer advantages in mobile warfare.