I am astonished at how Berger managed to destroy this august institution in a little under four years and no one in the Corps or its massive fan base outside the USMC could stop the destruction.
And when the generals finally linked arms, it was to write articles only. That’s fine, but they needed to go after Berger and the active duty generals who were in lockstep with him. Berger was a year behind me at Tulane. I’ve known him since 1977. Thank you for calling him out.
Rob, have you been able to ask him since that time and after the destruction of the Corps what he thought would happen? Lots of folks find his reduction or elimination of arty and tanks alarming but I actually think it a good call but poorly executed (a phase out with unmanned tanks filling the gap over time). I get the impression no one did a Concept of Operations and Employment for the SIF and did not have a red cell in the room to tease out critical shortcomings.
Bill - more to follow later today. Just know, I was invited to his assumption of command but not his turnover to Smith. I’ve been vocal about his destruction of the Marine Corps and him. I’m sure he knows exactly how I feel. He was a friend but there’s no love lost today. More later on your question.
The USMC have fought along the Army mostly in land campaigns since the Korean war. Sometimes in places that were land-locked (!), such as Afghanistan. The “marine” in the Marine Corps is now kind of false advertising; the Marine Corps mostly acts as extra land-power to plus-up the Army.
Thanks. I forgot to mention that the largest opposed amphibious invasion had zero USMC involved; the most dangerous beaches were tackled Army, Army Air Corps, US Navy, and a lot of allied countries militaries contributed on other beaches: D-Day
I am curious if we could close all the military bases around the world that house Marines and actually have them defend the only shores and borders they were required to defend Constitutionally instead of Decommissioning them? Like the U.S. Border?
With the obvious shortfalls of the secret service as of late, would be interesting to see them turn into a kind of praetorian guard. Although given what the praetorians eventually devolved into...
I have mixed feelings concerning this. Being a former Marine E5 there will always be a place in my heart for the Corps. But loyalties aside Truman, Eisenhower and Colin Powell had a well known disdain for the Marines which amounted to nothing more than inter service rivalry.
The 2030 plan is a death of 1,000 cuts. Relying on other branches to provide basic armor or air support is like a civilian relying on the 911 system.
You can argue that the aircraft carrier or the Corps is obsolete but a successful US foreign military policy has been obsolete for many decades. Most undoubtedly the Corps needs to adapt and overcome but I shudder to think that we allow ourselves to become a US military of 1930s.
Good morning Bill! I'm sure this one will get some attention. Coming out of USNA I said "no" to the USMC because I didn't want to sign up for a third "boot camp," by way of The Basic School. I've sometimes regretted that decision, because from a martial culture point of view, aside from smaller units, the USMC has a lock on the top spot in my opinion. Which is why I think their recruiting has suffered less than the other branches. Having said that...it seems to me that missiles, and drones (of all shapes and sizes), especially in combination with autonomy, are absolute game-changers. In general, more as opposed to fewer, smaller as opposed to larger, stealthier as opposed to more visible/detectable, faster as opposed to slower, and less expensive as opposed to more costly, seem to be trends. For these reasons I think carriers and their battle groups are little more than targets, ditto tanks, even helicopters at some point, will fall prey, literally. On the ground I look towards Afghanistan for some clues. Try as they/we might, it is decentralized versus centralized; another trend and advantage defensively. Cut off the head of the snake and seven grow back in it's place. Tribes are practically innumerable. The terrain is difficult for large armies. There's an AK or RPG behind every shrub, on the back side of every wall, an IED on every roadside; uniformed armies are targets, and counter-insurgency has failed at every attempt. And that's about the extent of my very limited "knowledge" of the subject, if it can be called that. I don't know what the solution(s) are, but growing the Army at the expense of the Marines doesn't seem directionally correct, aside from the faults with the USMC's 2030 plans, which I agree, seem non-sensical. Thank you for sharing, and I will bump this off some of my USMC friends for feedback.
John, great comment and you captured the essence of the failure cascade forced by the emerging technology to fundamentally change the nature of infantry combat in this century for the first time in millennia. This is strong medicine and unpleasant for former members of Uncle Sam's Misguided Children but there is no mission for them anymore that merits a continued relationship with the US Navy.
My next episode tackles the Army and I categorically do not want to increase its present leviathan size.
Per AFG, I have suggested most insurgencies are antifragile and all COIN is fragile by nature. When you apply that template, it provides an explanatory framework for the consistent failure of American arms since 1945.
All my invitations to the Marine Corps Ball have been rescinded.
Berger's attempt to recombobulate the Corps has certainly been a disaster.
But, IF the US regime is going to retain any active duty ground forces, the Marine Corps should constitute the entirety of those forces other than US Army cadre to train militia in case of need for mass mobilization.
Naturally, my history as a Marine Corps infantry NCO has nothing whatsoever to do with that position ;-)
Thomas, I have no doubt the Marines know their business as riflemen but the infantry game is changing inexorably in the 21st century whether we approve or not. Apart from those talents, the US Navy has done nothing to improve the amphibious capabilities and are now overwhelmed by history passing them by.
Don't worry, in my episode on the Army, I will not spare my firestorm of wrath.
I agree with you on both of those points. But the lessons I draw from them are different.
Amphibious landings have been obsolete for decades. Even Inchon was an outlier. Berger's idea of turning the Marine Corps back into a WW2-style "island-hopping" amphibious force is, in a word, stupid. And the ramifications -- particularly robbing the Corps of having its own artillery and other major support components -- are even worse. Those developments do, rightly, raise the question of "why bother keeping the Corps at all?"
My case for keeping the Corps stems from my "anarchy, but if not that at least reasonable military posture" position. A "national defense" that was actually focused on national defense would require a LOT less peacetime active-duty light infantry, but it would still require SOME infantry -- and that infantry would best function as part of a small, self-contained force capable of putting infantry on the ground pretty much anywhere on demand, and providing it with air and artillery support. That way you retain an ability to quickly project force at a distance while mobilizing your much larger militia.
Basically, I'd like to see the Marine Corps be (rather than occasionally be part of) the Rapid Deployment Force.
During my time, at least -- mid-80s to mid-90s -- the Corps was very good at that kind of mission with its Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, etc.
If the current imperial world police situation is going to continue, I agree that there's really not THAT much use for the Marine Corps. Or at least no UNIQUE use. So while I'd be sad to see it go from a nostalgia viewpoint, I do get your point. I guess maybe I'll live out my life being able to say "I'm something they're not making any more of."
I do have a job for USMC 0311 and by extension, Army 11B, to create a rotating cadre to train American militia as stay behind forces, domestic stand-in shadow forces and home guard guerrillas (think UK Home Guard Auxiliary units preparing for "Operation Sea Lion" succeeding) as a defensive measure for potential invasion but that will never happen because the Federal government doesn't trust privately armed humans.
You'll enjoy my coming evisceration of the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Assault Division (my alma mater).
I learned to rappel out of helicopters at the 101st's school at Fort Campbell!
Your cadre/militia idea sounds a lot like mine: If we're going to let the US government continue to exist and "defend" us, keep smaller active-duy forces and train civilians as basic riflemen, etc. so that mass mobilization for actual defense has trained people to call up.
Agree. Furl the color. I’d rather be remembered for what we were than what we’ve become.
I am astonished at how Berger managed to destroy this august institution in a little under four years and no one in the Corps or its massive fan base outside the USMC could stop the destruction.
And when the generals finally linked arms, it was to write articles only. That’s fine, but they needed to go after Berger and the active duty generals who were in lockstep with him. Berger was a year behind me at Tulane. I’ve known him since 1977. Thank you for calling him out.
Rob, have you been able to ask him since that time and after the destruction of the Corps what he thought would happen? Lots of folks find his reduction or elimination of arty and tanks alarming but I actually think it a good call but poorly executed (a phase out with unmanned tanks filling the gap over time). I get the impression no one did a Concept of Operations and Employment for the SIF and did not have a red cell in the room to tease out critical shortcomings.
Bill - more to follow later today. Just know, I was invited to his assumption of command but not his turnover to Smith. I’ve been vocal about his destruction of the Marine Corps and him. I’m sure he knows exactly how I feel. He was a friend but there’s no love lost today. More later on your question.
The USMC have fought along the Army mostly in land campaigns since the Korean war. Sometimes in places that were land-locked (!), such as Afghanistan. The “marine” in the Marine Corps is now kind of false advertising; the Marine Corps mostly acts as extra land-power to plus-up the Army.
Agreed, it's time to consolidate land forces.
Thanks. I forgot to mention that the largest opposed amphibious invasion had zero USMC involved; the most dangerous beaches were tackled Army, Army Air Corps, US Navy, and a lot of allied countries militaries contributed on other beaches: D-Day
I am curious if we could close all the military bases around the world that house Marines and actually have them defend the only shores and borders they were required to defend Constitutionally instead of Decommissioning them? Like the U.S. Border?
With the obvious shortfalls of the secret service as of late, would be interesting to see them turn into a kind of praetorian guard. Although given what the praetorians eventually devolved into...
That certainly is a possibility.
I have mixed feelings concerning this. Being a former Marine E5 there will always be a place in my heart for the Corps. But loyalties aside Truman, Eisenhower and Colin Powell had a well known disdain for the Marines which amounted to nothing more than inter service rivalry.
The 2030 plan is a death of 1,000 cuts. Relying on other branches to provide basic armor or air support is like a civilian relying on the 911 system.
You can argue that the aircraft carrier or the Corps is obsolete but a successful US foreign military policy has been obsolete for many decades. Most undoubtedly the Corps needs to adapt and overcome but I shudder to think that we allow ourselves to become a US military of 1930s.
Sees title, no time to listen yet… *angrily chews crayon*
The yellow ones taste the best.
Dominion stole 2000
General Wess Clark 7 Countries For a TV YouTube
Good morning Bill! I'm sure this one will get some attention. Coming out of USNA I said "no" to the USMC because I didn't want to sign up for a third "boot camp," by way of The Basic School. I've sometimes regretted that decision, because from a martial culture point of view, aside from smaller units, the USMC has a lock on the top spot in my opinion. Which is why I think their recruiting has suffered less than the other branches. Having said that...it seems to me that missiles, and drones (of all shapes and sizes), especially in combination with autonomy, are absolute game-changers. In general, more as opposed to fewer, smaller as opposed to larger, stealthier as opposed to more visible/detectable, faster as opposed to slower, and less expensive as opposed to more costly, seem to be trends. For these reasons I think carriers and their battle groups are little more than targets, ditto tanks, even helicopters at some point, will fall prey, literally. On the ground I look towards Afghanistan for some clues. Try as they/we might, it is decentralized versus centralized; another trend and advantage defensively. Cut off the head of the snake and seven grow back in it's place. Tribes are practically innumerable. The terrain is difficult for large armies. There's an AK or RPG behind every shrub, on the back side of every wall, an IED on every roadside; uniformed armies are targets, and counter-insurgency has failed at every attempt. And that's about the extent of my very limited "knowledge" of the subject, if it can be called that. I don't know what the solution(s) are, but growing the Army at the expense of the Marines doesn't seem directionally correct, aside from the faults with the USMC's 2030 plans, which I agree, seem non-sensical. Thank you for sharing, and I will bump this off some of my USMC friends for feedback.
John, great comment and you captured the essence of the failure cascade forced by the emerging technology to fundamentally change the nature of infantry combat in this century for the first time in millennia. This is strong medicine and unpleasant for former members of Uncle Sam's Misguided Children but there is no mission for them anymore that merits a continued relationship with the US Navy.
My next episode tackles the Army and I categorically do not want to increase its present leviathan size.
Per AFG, I have suggested most insurgencies are antifragile and all COIN is fragile by nature. When you apply that template, it provides an explanatory framework for the consistent failure of American arms since 1945.
All my invitations to the Marine Corps Ball have been rescinded.
Lol! I suppose we shouldn't find that surprising!
Berger's attempt to recombobulate the Corps has certainly been a disaster.
But, IF the US regime is going to retain any active duty ground forces, the Marine Corps should constitute the entirety of those forces other than US Army cadre to train militia in case of need for mass mobilization.
Naturally, my history as a Marine Corps infantry NCO has nothing whatsoever to do with that position ;-)
Thomas, I have no doubt the Marines know their business as riflemen but the infantry game is changing inexorably in the 21st century whether we approve or not. Apart from those talents, the US Navy has done nothing to improve the amphibious capabilities and are now overwhelmed by history passing them by.
Don't worry, in my episode on the Army, I will not spare my firestorm of wrath.
I agree with you on both of those points. But the lessons I draw from them are different.
Amphibious landings have been obsolete for decades. Even Inchon was an outlier. Berger's idea of turning the Marine Corps back into a WW2-style "island-hopping" amphibious force is, in a word, stupid. And the ramifications -- particularly robbing the Corps of having its own artillery and other major support components -- are even worse. Those developments do, rightly, raise the question of "why bother keeping the Corps at all?"
My case for keeping the Corps stems from my "anarchy, but if not that at least reasonable military posture" position. A "national defense" that was actually focused on national defense would require a LOT less peacetime active-duty light infantry, but it would still require SOME infantry -- and that infantry would best function as part of a small, self-contained force capable of putting infantry on the ground pretty much anywhere on demand, and providing it with air and artillery support. That way you retain an ability to quickly project force at a distance while mobilizing your much larger militia.
Basically, I'd like to see the Marine Corps be (rather than occasionally be part of) the Rapid Deployment Force.
During my time, at least -- mid-80s to mid-90s -- the Corps was very good at that kind of mission with its Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, etc.
If the current imperial world police situation is going to continue, I agree that there's really not THAT much use for the Marine Corps. Or at least no UNIQUE use. So while I'd be sad to see it go from a nostalgia viewpoint, I do get your point. I guess maybe I'll live out my life being able to say "I'm something they're not making any more of."
I raise a glass to you.
I do have a job for USMC 0311 and by extension, Army 11B, to create a rotating cadre to train American militia as stay behind forces, domestic stand-in shadow forces and home guard guerrillas (think UK Home Guard Auxiliary units preparing for "Operation Sea Lion" succeeding) as a defensive measure for potential invasion but that will never happen because the Federal government doesn't trust privately armed humans.
You'll enjoy my coming evisceration of the 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Assault Division (my alma mater).
I learned to rappel out of helicopters at the 101st's school at Fort Campbell!
Your cadre/militia idea sounds a lot like mine: If we're going to let the US government continue to exist and "defend" us, keep smaller active-duy forces and train civilians as basic riflemen, etc. so that mass mobilization for actual defense has trained people to call up.